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The SAFTIES (Space Station Axiomatic Fault Isolating Expert Systems)
System deals with the hierarchical distribution of control and knowledge
among independent expert systems doing fault isolation and scheduling of
Space Station subsystems. On its lower level, fault isolation is per-
formed on individual subsystems. These fault isolation expert systems
contain knowledge about the performance requirements of their particular
subsystem and corrective procedures which may be involved in response to
certain performance errors. They can control the functions of equipment
in their system and coordinate system task schedules. On a higher
level, the Executive contains knowledge of all resources, task schedules
for all subsystems, and the relative priority of all resources and
tasks. The executive can override any subsystem task schedule in order
to resolve use conflicts or resolve errors that require resources from
multiple subsystems. Interprocessor communication is implemented using
the SAFTIES Communications Interface (SCI). SCI is an application layer
protocol which supports the SAFTIES distributed multi-level architecture.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The SAFTIES project included the following goals:
Design a hierarchical system where one expert system (executive)
coordinates many expert systems to isolate faults and do related
processing.
+ Work supported under NASA contra_t NAS5-292BO.
* Sue Corer participated in this project while employed by STI. She is
currently associated with Digital Equipment Corp.
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Define a communications protocol (applications layer) to support
expert system interaction
Build a demonstration system which will form the basis for a test
bed for further definition and evaluation of distributed expert
system capabilities
This paper provides an overview of the demonstration system which was
developed to provide a proof-of-concept testbed for achievability of these
goals.
2.0 THE DISTRIBUTED HIERARCHICAL CONFIGURATION
Many of the feasibility questions associated with distributed processing and
hierarchical control can be most readily addressed in a testbed configura-
tion. Fault isolation was selected as the base-level element in the
hierarchy. In order to develop requirements which would support the
development of a meaningful test bed demonstration, it was necessary to
identify specific areas where the fault isolation would be performed.
Selection was influenced by an awareness of the potential long-term space-
based applications. The general domain areas chosen for this processing were:
I)
2)
3)
Robotics system (FIRES)
Communications system (FIESTA)
Environmental Factors reporting system (FISHES)
To support project objectives, the architecture for a Space station Axiomatic
_aul_ _solating Expert System (SAFTIES) (shown in Figure i) was developed.
As the figure indicates, two levels of control are present. Within the lower
level, the separate expert systems are operating on their defined domains of
responsibility. Communication between levels is provided by the SCI (SAFTIES
Communications Interface). The DMS (Data Management System) which would
support the SCI is presented symbolically in the overview.
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FIGURE I: SAFTIES SYSTEM OVERVIEW
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On the upper level, the executive function provides conflict resolution
between the various subsystems as well as allowing for the optimal
satisfaction of mission objectives by enforcing a prioritization of subsystem
objectives.
A hardware configuration which would provide a distributed environment was
identified. Functional allocation over the hardware configuration was
performed with establishment of hierarchical control as a major driver. This
resulted in the Functional allocation shown in Figure 2.
3.0
THE SAFETIES COMMUNICATION INTERFACE (SCI)
This implementation concerned itself primarily with the application layer of
the ISO Basic Reference Model of Open Systems Interconnection. A
summary of the desired capabilities are given in Table i. Table 2 gives
a list of the different kinds of message types used in the SAFTIES
demonstration. There are many other types of messages that could be
used in a full-fledged distributed system. The goal of the SCI protocol
is to allow expert systems to "plug in" to SAFTIES with minimal
alterations.
The Art Implementation
The lower level expert systems, running in ART on the Symbolics 3640,
receive SCI data as Follows: between every rule that Fires, the serial
line is read to see if data is present; if so, it reads the data and
asserts it as a fact; if not, processing continues as normal.
The Pascal Implementation
The Executive, running in Pascal on the Sperry IT/PC, receives SCI data
as follows: whenever the screen is idle (waiting For input from the
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user) and before the keyboard is checked to see if an input is received,
the serial "com" ports I and 2 are checked to see if data is present; if
so, it reads it. This is done on the DOS BIOS level using interrupts
and status registers. If it reads the serial line and data is present,
it analyzes the data read to make sure an entire SCI record is read; if
not, it issues consecutive reads until the entire SCI record is
received. If no data is present on either serial line, it checks the
keyboard for activity.
4.0 TESTBED CONFIGURATION COMPONENTS
This section presents each of the testbed configuration components.
Section 4.1 the simulation approach to data generation is described.
The three independent expert systems are presented in Section 4.2.
Section 4.3 then describes the executive expert system.
In
4.1 SIMULATION DRIVERS
Drivers are used to generate performance data and simulate Faults. The
simulation driver for each fault isolation expert system is written in
SLAM (Simulation Language for Alternative Modeling); a summary of the
drivers is given in Table 3. There are separate drivers for each expert
system. The variety and quantity of equipment for which data is
generated within each simulator is limited only by physical resources of
the host hardware. A nominal value, high and low tolerance values,
equipment code, and station (location of the equipment) are assigned to
each data generating equipment. Every 5 seconds a "reading" is taken;
under normal circumstances, the "reading" is a random number with a
triangular distribution (mean as the normal value, normal tolerance as
low value, high tolerance as high value). At random time periods,
however, these values will fall out of range. How the numbers fall out
of range is determined by the type of error.
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF SIMULATION DRIVERS
B
II
II
WRITTEN IN SLAM (SIMULATION LANGUAGE FOR ALTERNATIVE MODELING)
A NOMINAL VALUE, HIGH TOLERANCE AND LOW TOLERANCE IS INITIALLY ASSIGNED
TO EACH RESOURCE
EVERY 5 SECONDS DATA IS GENERATED FROM ALL RESOURCES SUPPORTING SERVICES
AND EVENTS; FOR EACH RESOURCE, IT IS A RANDOM NUMBER TRIANGULARLY
DISTRIBUTED BASED ON THAT RESOURCE'S NOMINAL, HIGH TOLERANCE AND LOW
TOLERANCE VALUES
ERRORS INVOLVING RESOURCE PERFORMANCE ARE GENERATED BOTH RANDOMLY AND AT
PRESET TIMES; WHEN AN ERROR HAS OCCURRED, THAT RESOURCE VALUE WILL:
- EXCEED HIGH TOLERANCE
-- SLOWLY
-- QUICKLY
-- IMMEDIATELY
-- DELAYED
- EXCEED LOW TOLERANCE
-- SLOWLY
-- QUICKLY
-- IMMEDIATELY
-- DELAYED
- START AND REMAIN AT AN OUT-OF-RANGE VALUE
ONCE IN ERROR, THE ERROR REMAINS FOR A RANDOM TIME PERIOD.
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4.2 THE INDEPENDENT EXPERT SYSTEMS
In this section the expert system nodes which occur in the SAFTIES
hierarchy are presented. These consist of the three base level expert
systems, FIRES (robotics), FISHES (environment), FIESTA (communications)
and the top level EXECUTIVE EXPERT SYSTEM (EES).
4.2.1 FIRES (Fault Isolation for Robot Expert System)
4.2.1.1 The FIRES System. An overview of FIRES requirements is
presented in Table 4. The FIRES expert system node receives
performance/status data from a robotics system. For purposes of the
testbed prototyping a Scara-type robot arm (4 degrees of freedom) was
selected For simulation. Readings on various aspects of the arm
operations are reported to FIRES every five seconds. All readings by
FIRES are assumed to have a nominal value and an accepted range of
operation as shown in Table 5.
The FIRES system employs a data-driven approach to diagnosis. When
performance values which fall outside the acceptable range are
encountered the relevant detection rules are activated. The detection
rules then report the anomaly and summarize the information in a manner
to support Further diagnostic processing.
For the FIRES system, Fault Diagnosis has been implemented using a
pattern-matching technique in a production system paradigm. This
implementation illustrates the technique of inferring Fault causes
directly from specific patterns of anomalies.
For the demonstration prototype, fault isolation was followed by sending
notification to the executive.
FIRES is implemented on a SYMBOLICS 3640 using the Automated Reasoning
Tool (ART) From INFERENCE Corporation. ART is an Expert System (ES)
-9-
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TABLE4
FIRES REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
v
II
|
I
FAULT ISOLATION FOR ROBOTICS
EXPERT SYSTEMS (FIRES)
I FUNCTIONS
- ISOLATE FAULTS IN THE ROBOT OPERATING SYSTEM
- INFORM EXECUTIVE OF MISSION CRITICAL FAULTS (ALARMS)
INPUTS
- EVENT SCHEDULE (CONTAINING ROBOT RESOURCE CONFIGURATION DATA)
- COMMAND (FROM EXECUTIVE)
PERFORMANCE DATA (FROM ROBOT RESOURCES)
-- JOINT POSITION AND/OR TORQUE
-- DRIVE TORQUE
-- GRIPPER (TACTILE SENSOR, POSITION, FORCE)
-- SENSOR DATA (VISION, FIBER OPTICS, THERMAL, PRESSURE,
STRAIN GAUGE)
OUTPUTS
- FI DIAGNOSTIC DATA
- EVENT STATUS, AS REQUESTED
- RESOURCE PERFORMANCE AND CONFIGURATION DATA, AS REQUESTED
HARDWARE
- SYMBOLICS 3640 (WITH OPTION TO MOVE TO MICROVAX II AI STATION)
- COAXIAL AND SERIAL CABLES
COMMUNICATIONS
- RS232 SERIAL INTERFACE TO SPERRY IT
- ETHERNET (CHAOSNET) CONNECTION TO VAX
SOFTWARE
- ART
- LISP
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TABLE 5
FIRES MONITORING PARAMETERS
(NOMINAL VALUES AND ACCEPTABLE RANGES)
ROBOT-BATTERY
SERVO TORQUE
ARM VELOCITY
GRIP-FORCE
GRIP-SENSE
NOMINAL
VALUE
18.0
I0.0
0.0
4.0
1.0
LOW
TOLERANCE
12.0
0.0
-18.0
3.0
0.0
HIGH
TOLERANCE
24.0
20.0
18.0
5.0
1.0
EQUIPMENT
CODE
E01
E02
E03
E04
E05
STATION/
LOCATION
CODE
01
01
02
03
03
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Development Tool which supports rapid prototyping. By providing basic
ES constructs, it allows expert system development to concentrate on the
knowledge engineering aspects of the task.
4.2.1.2 FIRES Simulation Driver. The FIRES driver simulates 5
performance monitoring pieces of equipment, obtaining readings of
battery power, servo motor torque, arm velocity, gripper force and
gripper presence sensor.
There are 6 possible errors which may occur:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
Arm locked in place (collision with obstacle)
Incorrect gripper (possibly incorrect configuration in
schedule)
Dropped object
Arm broken (collision with obstacle (wall) at high velocity)
Arm payload exceeded (picking up an object too heavy for the
robot)
Battery low on power
These errors occur randomly, approximately one error per minute. At the
end of the error, which lasts approximately 30 seconds, the readings
return to acceptable range, indicating a correction has occurred.
4.2.2
FISHES (Fault Isolation for Space Station Health/Status Exper_
System)
4.2.2.1 The FISHES System. The FISHES expert system node receives
performance data which is associated with health and status for an
assigned area of the spacecraft. Requirements and monitored
parameters similar to those presented for the FIRES system were
developed For FISHES.
The data-driven approach employed in FISHES was also applied for
detection of anomalies in the FIRES domain. The same form of pattern-
-12-
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matching strategy employedin FISHESwas adopted for FIRES. This
logical replication allowed for the timely availability of the FIRES
node during developmentand implementation of the testbed.
There was also physical replication since FISHEShas also been
implementedon a SYMBOLICS3640 using ART.
4.2.2.2 FISHES Simulation Driver. The FISHES driver simulates 6
performance monitoring pieces of equipment, obtaining readings of cabin
temperature, cabin pressure, percent oxygen, percent particulates, and
the spacecraft power consumption and power generation.
There are four possible errors which can occur:
I)
2)
3)
4)
Hole in spacecraft (broken seal, puncture due to poor docking
or meteor, etc.)
Fire in cabin
Faulty air Filter
Faulty pressure reading (indicating a malfunction in the
monitoring equipment itself)
These errors occur randomly, approximately one every minute, and last
for approximately 30 seconds. When the error is completed, the readings
return to within the acceptable range.
4.2.3 FIESTA (Fault Isolation Expert System for TDRSS Applications)
4.2.3.1 The FIESTA System. The specific requirements which are
relevant to the SAFTIES project are summarized in Table 6.
FIESTA is an evolving prototype expert system which has been developed
under the auspices of NASA/GSFC Code 532-1.* FIESTA is designed to
isolate faults in a communication network. The requirements guiding the
* Work was performed under the direction of Bendix Field Engineering
Corporation, NASA contract NAS5-27600.
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TABLE 6
FIESTA REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
(SAFTIES RELATED)
II
II
II
FAULT ISOLATION EXPERT SYSTEM FOR
I'DRSS APPLICATIONS (FIESTA)
FUNCTIONS
- RECEIVE AND MONITOR SPACE NETWORK STATUS INFORMATION
- ISOLATE FAULTS WHICH OCCUR ON THE NETWORK
- INFORM EES OF ISOLATED FAULTS
INPUTS
- STATUS INFORMATION IN THE FORM OF NASA'S CURRENT HIGH SPEED
MESSAGES
OUTPUTS
- HIGH LEVEL FAULT ISOLATION DIAGNOSTIC DATA
- ALARMS
HARDWARE
- SYMBOLICS 3640
COMMUNICATIONS
- RS232 SERIAL INTERFACE TO SPERRY IT
- ETHERNET (CHAOSNET) CONNECTION TO VAX
SOFTWARE
- ART
- LISP
-14-
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FIESTA development are contained in "FIESTA Project Development Folder/
Volume II: Prototype Requirements Specification" (STI/E-25190A,
17 December 1985). These requirements define FIESTA operating as a
standalone testbed. FIESTA employs a highly developed Axiomatic/
Hypothetical approach to fault isolation. Inclusion of FIESTA within
the distributed hierarchy allows an extensive demonstration of this
methodology.
FIESTA was incorporated in the distributed hierarchy via the SCI
interface described earlier. This served to validate the expansion
capabilities afforded by the SCI protocol.
4.2.3.2 FIESTA Simulation Driver. The FIESTA driver simulates 12
performance monitoring pieces of equipment. Errors in any service
(KSAR, SSAR or SSAF) occur as Follows:
The signal strength starts to degrade
When the signal strength falls below 3, then the locks go to
The number of Frames in lock starts to fall
When the frames in lock equal 0, then the data present goes to @.
Again, the errors occur randomly for a random amount of time. At the
end of the error, the readings return to acceptable ranges.
4.3 THE EXECUTIVE EXPERT SYSTEM (EES)
An overview of the requirements established for the Executive Expert
System (EES) are presented in Table 7.
4.3.1 The Domain of EES
EES receives high-level fault isolation data from lower-level expert
systems. In addition, EES can request operational parameters as
needed. All data received is in the SCI format. Upon receipt of
notification of a Fault, the Executive determines a corrective action
-15-
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TABLE7
EXECUTIVEXPERTSYSTEM(EES)
REQUIREMENTSSUMMARY
II
|
II
II
DESCRIPTION
- EXPERT SYSTEM SHELL DESIGNED TO AID ASTRONAUT/USER IN SCHEDULING,
COORDINATING, AND CONTROLLING OF DISTRIBUTED EXPERT SYSTEMS IN THE
SPACE STATION
FUNCTIONS
- PROVIDE HUMAN INTERFACE/WORKSTATION TO
-- RETRIEVE INFORMATION FROM EXPERT SYSTEMS
-- COMMAND
-- EFFECT FAULT ISOLATION PROCESSING
- RECEIVE FAULT ISOLATION DIAGNOSIS FROM DISTRIBUTED FAULT ISOLATION
EXPERT SYSTEMS AND SCHEDULE CORRECTIVE EVENT(S)
- ALLOCATE ASSIGNED RESOURCES, RESOLVING CONFLICTS AS THEY ARISE
- SCHEDULE EVENTS BASED ON PRIORITIES, NEED, AND REQUESTS
INPUTS
- SPACE STATION EVENT SCHEDULES (FROM NASA OR SCHEDULER EXPERT SYSTEM)
- HIGH LEVEL PERFORMANCE DATA
- FAULT ISOLATION DIAGNOSTIC DATA
- EVENT STATUS
- HUMAN EXPERT INPUT AND OVERRIDES
OUTPUTS
- COMMAND (TO LOWER EXPERT SYSTEMS)
- REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
- EVENT SCHEDULES AND PRIORITIES
- NOTIFICATION TO GROUND OF NONCORRECTABLE ERRORS
- HISTORY FILE
HARDWARE
- SPERRY IT
-- 7.14 MHz CLOCK
-- COLOR GRAPHICS MONITOR
- SERIAL CABLES
COMMUNICATIONS
- 2RS232 SERIAL INTERFACE TO SYMBOLICS 3640
SOFTWARE
- EXPERT SYSTEM WRIl_EN IN TURBO PASCAL
- SYNCHRONOUS COMMUNICATIONS ON BOTH SERIAL LINES ACHIEVED
-16-
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and schedules it, basedon the current operating state of the system
using a "least cost" algorithm.
4.3.2 EES User's Operational Description
The console normally displays the main menu (shown in Figure 3).
When this and most all other screens are displayed, EES is ready to
accept input from the user or receive data from lower level expert
systems.
For example, if item 2 (FIRES details) is selected from the main menu,
the FIRES menu is displayed (see Figure 4) whichallows FIRES specific
options to be selected.
Whenever a fault is isolated by one of the lower level expert systems
and sent to EES, the operator is alerted to an anomolous situation.
Notification is accomplished via an alarm window which pops up (non-
destructively) in whatever window is currently active. Figure 5
provides an illustration of this feature.
5.0 SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS
The major thrust of this investigation was the establishment of the
Framework for a test bed capable of supporting an investigation of
distributed expert system processing with hierarchically organized
domains of responsibility and control. As described in this paper, the
Framework has been established.
The current configuration consists of an executive system which
coordinates the activities of three individual expert systems at the
next lower hierarchical level. The secondary level expert systems have
separate domains and provide status summaries on their individual areas
of responsibility to the executive. Although the domains are separate,
the functions are similar, namely performance monitoring, fault
detection and Fault isolation.
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FIGURE3: MAIN MENU
FIGURE 4: FIRES MENU
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A major conclusion reached during this investigation is that a network
consisting of multiple expert systems with hierarchically distributed
control can be readily established. The feasibility of such a
configuration was verified by establishing a operational test bed
exhibiting these characteristics.
The simulation data wascorrectly monitored by the separate Fault
isolation system; nominal conditions being (implicitly) noted and
non-nominal being detected. A review of the data indicated that the
anomalies were being correctly identified. The executive demonstrated
its ability to co-ordinate the resource of independent systems and
correctly assign available resources to achieve problem resolution.
Another major conclusion (also implementedin the demonstration test bed
environment) involved techniques for implementing the hierarchical
control. It was shownthat conventional software engineering techniques
in the area of communicationprotocol, integrated with an expert system
executive process, was capable of supporting the candidate architecture.
The SCI was also shownto be capable of supporting integration of an
existing expert system (FIESTA) into the hierarchical structure.
Manyopen questions remain in the area of di.tributed processing and
control. The initial test bed structure provides an environment to
support investigations is this area.
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